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July-Aug., 1955

NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO AN AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES: Thus the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur appears to have been visibly widened in Colorado
in the case of La Rocco v. Fernandez.' The plaintiffs filed an action
for damages for personal injuries, property loss, and for the death
of their son as a result of an automobile accident. The accident
occurred when the defendants, each driving a separate vehicle,
sideswiped each other with the result that one car then crashed
head-on into the plaintiff's motor vehicle.
The court held that the peculiar circumstances of the case
plus the defensive pleadings and opening statements of each defendant, made out a prima facie case for the plaintiff. Each defendant in his answer and opening statement had admitted that
the accident was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries,
and each had accused the other of negligence. The court said:
It having been alleged by the plaintiff and admitted
by the defendants that the collision was proximately
caused by the negligence of one or both of the defendant
drivers, upon showing of loss a prima facie case was
automatically presented resulting in an issue of fact
requiring a solution by the jury; moreover the circumstances of the accident speak for themselves and that
therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
It is possible that the court in holding the res ipsa doctrine
applicable in this case, used language that was broader than necessary to decide the case. Certainly there can be but little dispute
that a prima facie case of negligence was made out upon the
plaintiff's showing of injury coupled with the other three elements
of the tort (duty, proximate cause, and lack of due care) which
were supplied by the defendants by their admissions in the answers
and opening statements. However if the court does mean that this
is a proper res ipsa case, it would appear to have overruled an
earlier Colorado Supreme Court case holding to the contrary.
Although not mentioned in the La Rocco case, in the case of Yellow
Cab Co. v. Hodgson 2 the Supreme Court held the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable. The question raised was whether the
plaintiff, a passenger in the taxicab of the defendant, could invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when injuries were sustained by
11954-1955 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4, p. 130.
291 Colo. 365, 14 P. 2d 1081.
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reason of a collision resulting from the separate and ununited but
concurrent acts of negligence of two automobile drivers when the
owners or drivers were made joint defendants. Upon these facts,
similar in general to the facts in the La Rocco case, the court stated
that this was a case of first impression in Colorado upon this point
and admitted that there was not much unanimity on the subject in
other jurisdictions. The court was convinced that the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine was not applicable in the Yellow Cab case and
said:
The evidence clearly established that the injury may
have resulted by reason of the concurrent negligence of
two or more persons or causes not both under the managment and control of defendant (i.e. defendant who is appealing, the other defendant did not appeal the case)
and therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable.
The view taken by the court in Yellow Cab v. Hodgson is supported by 45 Corpus Juris 1214, which states, "When either of
two defendants wholly independent of each other may be responsible for the injury complained of, the rule of res ipsa loquitur
cannot be applied." This position is again stated at 9B Blashfield
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 6046.
If the court, by the La Rocco decision, has widened the scope
of res ipsa loquitur in Colorado, and in effect, if not in fact, overruled the Yellow Cab decision, it would appear that the Colorado
res ipsa doctrine stands very close to the famous 1944 California
case of Ybarra v. Spangard et al , in which the plaintiff was injured while undergoing a surgical operation, and brought an action against all doctors and nurses participating in the operation.
The court said:
It may appear at the trial that one or more defendants will be found liable and the other absolved, but this
should not preclude the application of res ipsa loquitur.
The control, at one time or another, of every one or more
of the various agencies or instrumentalities which might
have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant . . . this, we think places upon them the burden
of initial explanation.
It will be interesting to learn if the broad language used by
the court in the La Rocco decision does really indicate an expansion
and liberalization of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Colorado.
RAYMOND J.
3 154

P. 2d 687, 162 A. L. R. 1258.
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DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATIONS WHEN THE STOCK IS
EVENLY DIVIDED.-Two recent Colorado decisions have made
the question of the appointment of a receiver for a solvent corporation where the stockholders are equally divided, one of interest. In Burleson v. Hayutin,' decided July 26, 1954, the Supreme
Court reversed the District Court and ordered the appointment of
a receiver. In this case the Supreme Court said:
The pages of reported cases and text writers are
full of situations showing that the courts have been reasonably liberal in the appointment of a receiver for a corporation, even though it is a solvent concern, where there
is such dissention among the stockholders, directors or
officers that the corporation cannot successfully carry on
its corporate functions; that iminent danger of loss of
assets is threatened; and that no other remedy appears
to be adequate. 43 A.L.R. 260.
In Hepner v. Miller,2 decided Oct. 4, 1954, the Supreme
Court reversed the same District Court which in this case had appointed a receiver and ordered dissolution. The Supreme Court
said:
Our holdings having been consistent with the great
weight of authority, we must resolve the instant case
against the plaintiffs and hold that a court has no power,
in the absence of a permissive statute, to dissolve a going
solvent corporation, to appoint a receiver to sell its assets,
and divide the proceeds of such sale among the stockholders.
In the Hepner case the plaintiffs and defendants each held
50% of the stock of the corporation. There was complete dissention
among the stockholders and the same Board of Directors had been
in control for over three years because of the inability to elect a
new board. However it is admitted by the plaintiffs that the sole
point involved is:
• . . whether a corporation which is solvent, free from
debt and operating can be dissolved and a receiver appointed at the instance of a stockholder when no fraud is
alleged." Counsel also admit there is not statutory authority in Colorado for the appointment of a receiver for a
corporation on behalf of a stockholder.
Thus the Court pointed out that there is no charge of fraud
or mismanagement by the plaintiff but only the fact that there is
an inability to hold a valid stockholders' meeting at which anything
could be accomplished. Thus there cannot be a new board of directors elected or the charter amended as desired by the plaintiff.
1273' P. 2d 124, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 17, p. 427.
2 274 P. 2d 818, 1954-55 C.B.A. Colo. Adv. Sh. No. 1, p. 29.
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By its decision the Supreme Court held that these facts alone are
not sufficient to dissolve a solvent corporation.
The Court ordered the cause remanded with directions to
discharge the receiver and to dismiss the action.
The Court distinguishes the Burleson case on its facts and
also by the statement, "We did not order the dissolution of the
corporation in the Burleson case."
In the Burleson case it was determined that there was an
equal division of stockholders and the affairs of the corporation
were thus bogged down. Also the Court said:
. . . it just as fully appeared that one-half of the stockholders or the interest of the corporation was assuming
full control and acted accordingly to their own use and
benefit all to the exclusion of Burleson; that ample arrangements were made to absorb much of the income of
the corporation by salaries created and bonuses provided
for, without any recognition of Burleson, by which he
should share in the benefits due him as owner of one-half
of the corporate stock of the corporation.
Thus the differences between the two cases are clearly distinguishable on their facts as stated by the Supreme Court.
But the second difference made by the Supreme Court is not
quite so clear.
In the Burleson case the plaintiff prayed "for an accounting,
for dissolution of the corporation and for receivership and damages." With the exception of the claim for damages the Hepner
case prayed for substantially the same relief. However in the
Burleson case the court reversed and remanded:
with directions to appoint a receiver; and then proceed
toward an accounting of the affairs of the corporation
during the period in which, through the operations of the
holders of the other fifty per cent of the stock, Burleson
found himself to be in the position of an outsider, through
no fault of his own.
As pointed out above the Hepner case was reversed with directions
to dismiss. Even though the Court had no power to order a dissolution of the corporation in the absence of a permissive statute, the
remedy of having a receiver appointed, was available as shown in
the Burleson case. This remedy was denied the plaintiff in the
Hepner case, if he had desired it, by the order to dismiss.
One other Colorado case which touches directly on this point
is The People ex rel Daniels v. The District Court of the City and
County of Denver, and Mullins, as Judge thereof.3 This was an
action by a minority stockholder to dissolve a solvent corporation.
It was before the Supreme Court on Petition for Writ of Prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the District Court to appoint
3

33 Colo. 293 (1905).
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a receiver. The complaint averred that the managers had diverted
the corporation from its true object and carried on their business
to their own enrichment and to the injury of other stockholders,
and were guilty of acts ultra vires.
The Court said in this case:
It is also the rule in this state, as generally in this
country, that in the absence of a permissive statute, courts
of equity have no power to dissolve a going business corporation and to that end appoint a receiver for the
sequestration of the corporate property.
The Court also indicated, in the opinion, that even if a receiver had
been asked to manage the business, and fraud and ultra vires acts
had been alleged, it would not be disposed to grant the relief.
In summary, it would appear from the three Colorado cases
that the Colorado Court would follow the theory that they have no
power to dissolve a solvent corporation, but if sufficient facts are
shown as to fraud, mismanagement, etc., then the Court will appoint a receiver to run the corporation and under such facts this
may be the relief granted even though this is not the relief specifically prayed for.
A. ROBERT MCMULLEN
Editor's Note: For a recent decision involving this issue see Savageau
v. Savageau, Inc., 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No 12.

Notes From The Secretary
On the following pages you will find once again a reprinting
of some of the Canons of Ethics and a few headnotes from pertinent
opinions of the American Bar Association Committee, interpreting
these Canons. Also included is an editorial reprinted from the
Journal of the American Judicature Society, and that I am sure
you will find interesting reading, and a list of the new committees
of the Denver Bar Association, as recently appointed by President
Richard Tull.
President Tull was extremely elated when he received over 150
requests from members of the Denver Bar Association to serve
on committees. He was very sorry that he could not satisfy every
request, but to do so would have made some committees too large
and ineffective. He hopes that those appointed to the committees
will take their appointments seriously and endeavor to meet and
work when the occasion demands it. He also hopes that the local
members will continue to exemplify their interest in Bar Association activities by attending the monthly luncheon meetings, that
will begin again this Fall; attending Institute meetings and any
other special meetings the Bar Association may sponsor. In addition, he welcomes any suggestions or criticisms of Bar functions

